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UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW

Guns N' Ganja: How Federalism
Criminalizes the Lawful Use of
Marijuana
Ira P. Robbins*
Federalism is a vital tenet of our Republic. Although federal law is the
supreme law of the land, our Constitution recognizes the integral role that
state law plays in the national scheme. Like any pharmaceuticaldrug that
withstands rounds of clinical testing, state law functions as a laboratory in
which Congress can evaluate and potentially adopt novel policies on a
nation-wide basis. Most of the time, federal and state law exist
harmoniously, complementing one another; other times, however, the two
systems clash, striking a dissonant chord.
In the United States, state marijuana laws are currently on a crash
course with federal marijuana law, exemplifying the discordant
consequences our dual-system of laws sometimes generates. Eight states
and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuanause,
yet under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") marijuana remains
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American University, Washington College of Law. A.B. University of Pennsylvania;
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colleagues and my friends, and to Dean Camille Nelson, for providing summer
financial support.
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illegal in the eyes of federal law. Mere confusion concerning the legality of
marijuana is not the only consequence, however. One notable casualty
ensuing from the battle of the mutually exclusive federal and state
marijuana laws is the deprivation of rights belonging to the unsuspecting,
average citizen.
The CSA establishes a schedule of drugs, and various federal regimes
such as entitlement programs and welfare benefits - impose compliance
with the CSA as a necessary antecedent for conferral of those benefits. For
example, although possessing a firearm is a fundamental right under the
Second Amendment, citizens who wish to lawfully smoke marijuana can
no longer avail themselves of this fundamental right. Section 922(g) (3) of
the Gun Control Act prevents users of Schedule I drugs pursuant to the
CSA - irrespective of state law -from possessing or owning a firearm.
Marijuana, despite its lack of potentialfor addiction, plethora of medical
benefits, and disconnect from violence, has always been a Schedule I drug
essentially deemed more addictive and dangerous than
methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug. Unknowing, ordinary citizens are
consequently caught in this legal black hole, contemplating how conduct
can be both lawful and unlawful.
This Article proposes a simple solution to a complex problem:
deschedule marijuana. The Article first surveys the past, observing that
the Nixon Administration's placement of marijuana in Schedule I rang of
racial undertones, and then examines the present, noting the majority of
states that have legalized medicinal marijuana and the numerous
anecdotal reports of its alleviating properties. Further, enforcing
§ 922(g) (3) against individuals who consume marijuana lawfully
pursuant to state law simultaneously overreaches and under-reaches,
failing to target the violent criminals that Congress initially sought to
apprehend. Thus, the federal government's insistence on maintaining
marijuanain Schedule I undermines principles of federalism and prevents
law-abiding citizens from fully exercising their constitutionalright to own
afirearm.
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INTRODUCTION

There are few things in life as momentous as a young couple
purchasing their first home. Mary and Mike were fresh off their
honeymoon and sought to embark on a long, prosperous life together
in Denver, Colorado. Indeed, everything was picture-perfect for the
couple until this new home began to feel like a house of cards.
On the night of the incident, Mary and Mike were out to dinner,
celebrating life as they knew it. When they returned home, however,
they were alarmed to find their front door slightly ajar. They peeked
through the crack in the door and discovered their house in shambles.
Upon further investigation, they realized that they had been
burglarized - their most valuable possessions were gone.
In the weeks following the traumatic incident, Mike decided to
purchase a firearm to protect his new family. He hoped that the
firearm would provide safety and comfort in a world filled with
senseless violence; but, rather than serve as a shield, his gun caused a
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fatal wound. Mary and Mike occasionally smoked marijuana, which is
legal in the state of Colorado but illegal under federal law. By
purchasing the firearm, Mike consequently triggered a federal
provision that implicates felonious criminal sanctions.
Section 922(g)(3) in Title 18 of the United States Code criminalizes
the concurrent possession of a firearm and drugs. Although marijuana
is now legal in eight states and the District of Columbia, marijuana
remains illegal in the eyes of the federal government. Under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), marijuana is a Schedule I drug.'
The landmark Supreme Court case, District of Columbia v. Heller,2
established that the Second Amendment protects the right to own a
firearm.3 It necessarily follows that, for the government to pass a law
restricting the possession of firearms, it must pass strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, this conflict presents confusion for those that smoke
recreational marijuana in states that have legalized it: in these states,
violating federal law will result in revocation of federal benefits and
even the right to own a firearm.
The Framers constructed the United States based upon federalism, a
major principle of our nation. Federalism recognizes that federal law
-

that Congress enacts -

is the supreme law of the land. However, it

also delegates general police power to the states. This delegation serves
a fundamental purpose, allowing each state to function quasiindependently and operate as a laboratory for lawmaking.
Accordingly, states are free to enact legislation regarding anything
from the legal age to operate a motor vehicle to physician-assisted
suicide.
Federal law should respect states' decisions to legalize marijuana
because of the harsh ramifications for seemingly innocuous conduct
- smoking marijuana in a state where it is legalized. In most of the
states, the corresponding ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana were
introduced by the people vis-A-vis referenda. Thus, this form of federal
governmental intrusion undermines fundamental principles of
federalism, effectively ignoring the will of the people.
Using a regulatory scheme similar to that of alcohol and tobacco to
regulate marijuana sales not only respects the notion of federalism, but
also provides a time-tested structure to regulate "harmful substances."
Several federal agencies control alcohol and tobacco and operate on a
national level; these agencies, however, have counterparts on the state
I See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (2018).
2 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
3 See id. at 628 (narrowing the application of the Second Amendment "to the
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute").

20181

Guns N' Ganja

1787

level that regulate alcohol and tobacco in a way that is most suitable to
each specific state. For example, taxes on alcohol and tobacco sales
produce enormous revenue - in fact, tobacco is taxed federally and
then each state may levy an additional tax without undermining the
federal one. Notably, if a certain county or municipality within a state
does not want to sell alcohol or tobacco, it may simply "opt out" of
doing so. This concept is also applied to marijuana: many counties in
Colorado have decided not to sell marijuana, even though doing so is
legal throughout the state.4 The current cooperation between federal
and state government in regulating alcohol and tobacco provides a
useful blueprint for the regulation of the marijuana industry.
An examination of the history behind the placement of marijuana in
Schedule I reveals its oversight. Not only did Congress myopically
place marijuana in Schedule I, but by refusing to deschedule it,
Congress also ignored contrary evidence relating to its medical
benefits and low risk of addiction. First, during the Nixon
Administration, considerations other than marijuana's potential
harmful effects marred the decision to place it in Schedule I.
Particularly, racial animus motivated the decision, targeting minorities
and charging non-violent individuals with felonies.5 Second, Congress
is now disregarding compelling evidence showing that marijuana has
substantial health benefits, such as treating chronic pain, glaucoma,
and Alzheimer's. 6 Further, studies have shown that marijuana use does
not typically coincide with violent tendencies.7 Consequently,
§ 922(g)(3) is over-inclusive, encompassing the casual marijuana user,
and under-inclusive, failing to indict the "presumptively risky people"
that are statistically more likely to be violent.8
This Article advocates for the descheduling of marijuana under the
CSA. Marijuana users who own firearms face harsh consequences
under federal law, even though their marijuana use is lawful under
state law. Part I addresses three distinct topics. Sections LA and L.B
outline the underlying policy behind gun ownership and drug use,
respectively. Those ideas then culminate in Section LC, which
discusses the interplay between federal and state marijuana laws.
Specifically, this Part introduces the vehicle that will steer the analysis
of the conflict's resolution: § 922(g)(3). Section IL.A then contends
that marijuana does not belong in Schedule 1: the reasons for its
4 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 40, 117 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
8 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983).
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original placement were not compelling then, and the reasons for its
continued placement are even less compelling now. Section IL.B argues
that § 9 2 2 (g) (3) is both over- and under-inclusive; the current scheme
fails to accomplish Congress's regulatory goals - keeping guns out of
the hands of presumptively risky people. Finally, this Article
concludes that the most effective way to effectuate the purpose of
§ 922(g)(3) while still respecting state sovereignty is by descheduling
marijuana.
I.

GUNS, GANJA, AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE

Two

Federalism rises and falls on the fact that, although a national
system of laws exists, the national system defers to each independent
state sovereign to operate its own legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. The concept of federalism has invited contentious debate
since the Framers drafted the Constitution. Some contend that the
national system depends on state autonomy, while others reduce state
government to "mere 'planets' orbiting the federal 'sun."'9 It seems
natural that, on many occasions, the federal and state systems must
cooperate to establish a set of rules that regulates the conduct of
citizens. Indeed, the lack of cooperation in some instances may create
an ambiguous legal black hole, causing the legal status of certain
conduct to enter a state of flux.
The efforts of eight states and the District of Columbia to legalize
recreational marijuana created precisely that type of confusing legal
black hole.10 The uncertainty stemming from the state legalization of
marijuana and the federal criminalization of marijuana will not be
resolved without cooperation between the federal and state
governments. Accordingly, in the context of the Gun Control Act, an
exploration of its components - guns, drugs, and the intersection of
the two, § 922(g)(3) - is foundationally necessary.
9 Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the National and
State Governments in the American Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
971, 974-75 (1996) (discussing the history of federalism and detailing that some
Framers, such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, argued that state autonomy
was merely incidental to a national system of laws, but other Framers, such as Patrick
Henry and George Mason, believed that "the preservation of state autonomy was
critical").
10 Up to the point of publication of this Article, Alaska, California, Colorado,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington have all legalized
recreational marijuana. See Alicia Wallace, Where Is Weed Legal? Map of U.S.
Marijuana Laws
by
State,
CANNABIST
(Oct.
14,
2016,
12:59 PM),
http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/10/14/legal-marijuana-laws-by-state-map-unitedstates/62772.
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Guns: The ConstitutionalRight to Own a Firearm

Although the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution
gives citizens a right to bear arms, that right is not absolute."
Throughout history, Congress and the Supreme Court have gradually
shaped the contours of the Second Amendment by distinguishing its
limitations.12 In its first attempt to regulate gun purchases, Congress
passed the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA"), which imposed an
excise tax on gun sales. 13 Congress placed further limitations on gun
purchasers and sellers by passing the Gun Control Act of 1968
("GCA").14 In an attempt to preserve Congress's original legislative
intent, the Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the GCA
broadly, increasing restrictions on gun dealers and owners. 15 While
strict regulations that impede or prevent gun ownership in the home
receive the most stringent scrutiny, 16 the Court has consistently
allowed legislatures to place limits on the Second Amendment's reach
to certain individuals and products.17 Consequently, certain types of

11 See U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.").
12 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (confining the
application of the Second Amendment "to the home, where the need for defense of
self, family, and property is most acute").
13 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (2018).
14 See 18 U.S.C. H§ 921-931 (2018) (expanding the gun dealer licensing and
record keeping requirements, and placing specific limitations on the sale of
handguns). In amending the GCA, Congress further limited the ability to lawfully
purchase a gun to those who can pass a background check. See § 922(t) (establishing
the federal background check system that implements various restrictions on gun
purchases and that every individual who purchases from a licensed seller must pass);
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/
services/cjis/nics (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) ("Before ringing up the sale, cashiers call
in a check to the FBI or to other designated agencies to ensure that each customer
does not have a criminal record or isn't otherwise ineligible to make a purchase.").
'5 See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (asserting that
"federal law rather than state law controls the definition of what constitutes a
conviction" that would prevent an individual from purchasing a gun); Barrett v.
United States, 423 U.S. 212, 215 (1976) (stressing that § 922(h), which forbids
convicted felons from purchasing a "firearm [if] at some time in its past [it] had
traveled in interstate commerce," imposes an additional limitation on convicted felons'
gun ownership).
16 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying strict
scrutiny to and upholding a regulation that effectively impaired a law-abiding citizen's
ability to legally own a weapon).
17 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012)
(subjecting a law that limited an individual's ability to carry a firearm in public to

1790

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:1783

conduct permissibly narrow an individual's constitutional right to own
or possess a firearm, one example being drug use.' 8
B.

Ganja: The Controlled Substances Act and Its National Scheme

Federal and state governments have always played a role in
regulating drug use in the United States. As the volume of drug use
has increased, the role of the government has as well. As a result,
Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") in 1970,
attempting to confront the effects of rampant, nation-wide drug use.19
The CSA established marijuana as a Schedule I drug based on its
potential dangerous health effects and the Nixon Administration's
view of minority groups that it assumed to be associated with the
drug. 20 State governments, however, have taken a variety of
approaches to regulating marijuana - some legalized it completely,
some legalized it only for medical purposes, and some have not
legalized it at all. 21 Unlike how federal and state governments have
cooperated to regulate alcohol, federal and state governments have not
cooperated to regulate marijuana, which has resulted in many
conflicting policies.
1.

The Controlled Substances Act

Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA")22 in 1970,
creating a unified federal drug policy to combat the heightening drug
epidemic. 23 The CSA prohibits the "importation, manufacture,
distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled
substances." 24 Broadly stated, its purpose is to "maintain the health
intermediate scrutiny).
18 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(1) (barring felons from possessing firearms);
§ 922(g)(3) (barring drug users from possessing firearms); § 921(a)(33)(A)
(preventing domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms); see also
United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a statute
prohibiting drug users from possessing firearms was subject only to intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny because these users pose a safety threat to the
public).
19 See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (2018).
20 See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (detailing the reasons why
marijuana was initially placed in Schedule 1).
21 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (surveying various state
government approaches to the regulation of marijuana).
22 21 U.S.C. H§ 801-802.
23 See KENNETH BAUMGARTNER, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HANDBOOK (2015).
24 21 U.S.C. § 801(2).
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and general welfare of the American people." 25 The CSA seeks to
bolster prevention, rehabilitation, and law enforcement efforts. 26
The CSA is comprised of five "schedules," categorized by potential
for abuse, current accepted medical use, and risk of psychological or
physical dependence.27 Schedule I is reserved for the most dangerous
drugs for which "no currently accepted medical use in treatment"
exists. 28 For example, Schedule I consists of hazardous substances
such as heroin, acid, and gamma-hydroxybutyrate, a common date
rape drug. 29 In comparison, substances in Schedules II and III
currently have accepted medical uses, despite also having a high
potential for abuse and risk of developing dependence. 30 For instance,
drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and anabolic steroids are
included in Schedules 1I and III.31 Lastly, substances in Schedules IV
and V not only have currently accepted medical uses, but they also
have a lower potential for abuse and lower risk of developing
dependence.32 These drugs are commonly found in medications like
Ambien, Xanax, cough syrups, and decongestant antihistamines. 33
Although Congress compiled these initial schedules, either Congress
or the U.S. Attorney General may add, remove, or transfer drugs from

25

Id.

26 H.R. REP. No. 1444, at 4567 (1970) (purporting that the CSA was enacted to

combat drug abuse in the United States "(1) through ... drug abuse prevention and
rehabilitation of users, (2) through providing more effective means for law
enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by providing for an
overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs").

See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)-(5) (2018).
28 Id. § 812 (b)(1) (requiring that Schedule I drugs (A) have a "high potential for
27

abuse," (B) have "no currently accepted medical use in treatment," and (C) lack any
"accepted safety for use").
29 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2018).
30 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2)-(3) (describing Schedule III drugs as those having a (A)
potential for abuse less than the substances listed in Schedule 1, (B) "currently
accepted medical use," and (C) moderate to severe risk of physical or psychological
dependence).
31

21 C.F.R. H§ 1308.12-.13 (2018).

21 U.S.C § 812(b)(4)-(5) (explaining that Schedule IV and V drugs have a (A)
"low potential for abuse" relative to drugs listed in Schedules I, II, and III; (B)
"currently accepted medical use"; and (C) "limited [potential for] physical ... or
psychological dependence").
33 See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.15 (2018) (listing substances that contain "[niot more
than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams"); Dihistine DH
Liquid, DRUGS.COM
(June 3, 2015),
https://www.drugs.com/cdi/dihistine-dhliquid.html (identifying codeine as an active ingredient that treats the "common cold,
flu, ... hay fever, and other upper respiratory allergies").
32
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one schedule to another.34 Congress must amend schedules through
its legislative process, requiring bicameral assent; in contrast, the
Attorney General can unilaterally accomplish the same through
informal rulemaking. 35 Subsequently, the Attorney General delegated
that authority to the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). 3 6
The CSA provides a list of factors to consider when determining
whether to re- or de-schedule a substance, including potential for
abuse, risk to public health, and risk of physical or psychological
dependence.3 7 Before amending any of the schedules, however, the
Attorney General must collect data, gather scientific and medical
evaluations, and solicit a recommendation from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services concerning the substance under review.38
In contrast to a lengthier legislative process, § 811 provides a quicker,
more flexible alternative that can more properly emulate scientific
advances.39

34 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2018); see United States v. Huerta, 547 F.2d 545,
547 (10th Cir. 1977) ("We are convinced that the clear intent of Congress was that
the schedules should remain as initially adopted until changed by action of the
Attorney General.").
35 See Olsen v. Holder, 610 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (" [T]he
Attorney General 'may by rule' add drugs to a schedule or transfer a drug from one
schedule to another if the Attorney General determines that the drug or substance has
a potential for abuse and that the drug or substance otherwise meets the scheduling
criteria under § 812(b)." (quoting § 811(a)(1)(A)-(B))).
36 28 C.F.R. § 0.100 (2017) (delegating the Attorney General's authority to schedule
drugs to the DEA); see United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827, 840 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding
that "delegation of the authority [from the Attorney General to the DEAl to schedule drugs
is constitutionally permissible"); see also Douglas C. Throckmorton, Re-Scheduling
PrescriptionHydrocodone Combination Drug Products: An Important Step Toward Controlling
Misuse and Abuse, FDA (Oct. 6, 2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/10/rescheduling-prescription-hydrocodone-combination-drug-products-an-important-steptoward-controlling-misuse-and-abuse (rescheduling hydrocodone combination products
from Schedule III to Schedule II).
37 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) ("(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse, (2) [s]cientific
evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known, (3) [tlhe state of current scientific
knowledge regarding the drug or other substance, (4) li]ts history and current pattern
of abuse, (5) [t]he scope, duration, and significance of abuse, (6) [wlhat, if any, risk
there is to the public health, (7) [il ts psychic or physiological dependence liability,
[and] (8) [w]hether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under this subchapter.").

38 Id. § 811(b).
39 The CSA also provides interested parties with the opportunity to challenge an
interim ruling on descheduling or rescheduling a substance. See id. § 811(j)(3).
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Marijuana as a Schedule I Drug

Marijuana, one of the most widely used drugs in the world, has been
used medicinally and recreationally as far back as 7,000 B.C.4 0 Some
patients and medical professionals report that marijuana alleviates
pain and other symptoms associated with illnesses ranging from
arthritis to cancer.4 ' Users typically smoke marijuana, although they
can also ingest it in edible or liquid form.42 Despite its history, usage,
and medical benefits, marijuana policies vary wildly around the
world.43
Scheduling marijuana sparked a contentious debate, commissioning
a series of studies, reports, and expert recommendations. Congress
placed marijuana in Schedule I initially, deferring to the executive
branch to commission studies and ultimately determine its appropriate
classification.44 Although early findings were not conclusive enough to
warrant reclassification, 45 subsequent reports de-emphasized the
See Ethan B. Russo et al., Phytochemical and Genetic Analyses of Ancient Cannabis
EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 4171, 4177 (2008) (positing that
"[ancient cultures] cultivated cannabis for pharmaceutical, psychoactive, or divinatory
purposes").
41 THC, THCA, CBD, CBC, CBN: Medical Marijuana Composition, the Chemicals in
40

from Central Asia, 59 J.

Cannabis, UNITED

PATIENTS GRP.

(Apr. 11, 2014), https://unitedpatientsgroup.com/

(listing
medicinal
blog/2014/04/1 1/thc-thca-cbd-cbn-the-chemicals-in-cannabis
benefits for ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease), Alzheimer's, anxiety, chemotherapy side
effects, Crohn's Disease, chronic pain, fibromyalgia, HIV-related peripheral
neuropathy, HIV-related wasting, Huntington's Disease, incontinence, insomnia,
multiple sclerosis, pruritus, sleep apnea, Tourette Syndrome, muscle spasms, chronic
Lupus, endometriosis, menstrual cramps, depression, Dravet syndrome, acne, ADD,
Parkinson's, schizophrenia, neurodegenerative diseases, glaucoma, diabetes, epilepsy,
migraines, and stimulating bone growth).

See id.
43 Compare Law No. 20000 art. 1, Febrero 16, 2005,
42

DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)
(decriminalizing possession of marijuana in Chile), and Decriminalizationof Drug Use
Act, LAW LIBR. CONGRESS (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/
possession
of
(decriminalizing
decriminalization-of-narcotics/portugal.php#Law
marijuana for personal use in Portugal), with Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, c. 38 (Eng.)
(establishing marijuana as a Class B drug in England, and criminalizing its
possession). See generally Emma Brant, Where in the World Can You Legally Smoke
Cannabis?, BBC (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/29834450/
where-in-the-world-can-you-legally-smoke-cannabis (noting that marijuana is legal to
possess in Ecuador, the Czech Republic, Peru, Uruguay, and Portugal but illegal in
Costa Rica and the United Kingdom).
44 Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 135 (D.D.C.
1980) ("Unsure of marijuana's effects, Congress placed marijuana in Schedule I, with
its program of strict controls, until it could obtain more scientific information on the
drug's effects.").
45 See SEC'Y OF THE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUc., & WELFARE, MARIHUANA AND HEALTH:
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harmful consequences of marijuana consumption. 46 In fact, in one
legislative hearing, Dr. Stanley F. Yolles, former Director of the
National Institute of Mental Health, refuted many of the
misconceptions surrounding the dangers of marijuana.4 7 Dr. Yolles
concluded, for example, that "mari[jluana does not cause physical
addiction," "less than 5% of chronic users ...

go on to heroin use,"

and "mari[j]uana is not a narcotic except by statute." 48 Accordingly,
some supporters ultimately recommended decriminalizing the
possession of marijuana; 49 nonetheless, marijuana remains a Schedule
I substance.
Although fear of deficient information regarding its effects
seemingly influenced the executive branch's decision to place
marijuana in Schedule I, racial undertones influenced it as well. While
the Commission's report was pending, President Nixon and his aides
leveraged the criminalization of marijuana to harm specific minority
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 13-14 (1971) (concluding that more research is necessary

to determine the long-term effects of marijuana). Not infrequently, the government
will either place a drug in Schedule I, or retain it in Schedule I, if its long-term impact
is inconclusive. See, e.g., German Lopez, The DEA Won't Ban Kratom After All, Vox
(Oct. 12, 2016, 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12941112/kratom-deaban (placing kratom, an opioid painkiller, in Schedule I because there is "not enough
evidence to legally allow widespread public consumption"). Precaution is often a
primary motivation behind the placement of drugs in Schedule I. See United States v.
Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (rationalizing that a drug should
remain in Schedule I if its effects are unknown); see also Lopez, supra (explaining that
the DEA's move was "largely an act of caution").
46 See SEC'Y OF THE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, MARIHUANA AND HEALTH:
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS vii (1975) (declining to give marijuana a
"clean bill of health," but also refuting the "fear and irrationality" that characterize the
public debate about the drug); THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE,
MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 433 (1972) (advocating that "an absolute
prohibition of possession" is inappropriate, misallocates law enforcement resources,
and "contributes very little to the achievement of our social policy"); see also Gabriel
G. Nahas & Albert Greenwood, The First Report of the National Commission on
Marihuana (1972): Signal of Misunderstanding or Exercise in Ambiguity, 50 BULL. N.Y.
ACAD. MED. 55, 55 (1974) (interpreting the reports on marijuana "as the first step
toward elimination of all mari[j Iuana laws").
7 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, at 4577-78 (1970); see also Chronology of NIMH
Directors, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/directors/
index.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (indicating that Dr. Yolles was the director of
NIMH from 1964 until 1970).
48 H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 4577-78 (explaining that marijuana use is not linked
to violence and crime - in fact, Dr. Yolles testified that marijuana users "tend to be
passive").
49 E.g., THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, supra note 46, at 191
(advocating that "lp]ossession of mari[j]uana for personal use [should] no longer be
an offense").
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communities that stereotypically used marijuana.5 0 For instance, John
Ehrlichman, one of Nixon's top aides, expounded on the issue:
We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the
war or blacks, but by getting the public to associate the hippies
with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could
arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings,
and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we
know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.51
Despite the Commission's ultimate recommendation, Nixon refused to
legalize marijuana, specifically targeting its users.52 Consequently,
Nixon's rigid stance not only shaped initial attitudes about marijuana,
but permeated subsequent judicial decision-making as well.5 3
Despite the controversy surrounding marijuana's placement in
Schedule 1, advocates have continually failed to successfully lobby the
courts for change. Indeed, courts have upheld the placement of
marijuana in Schedule I for two distinct reasons. First, the judiciary
has deferred to Congress's intent to maintain the scheduling of

50 See id. at 436 ("[Slome police may use the mari[j]uana laws to arrest people
they don't like for other reasons, whether it be their politics, their hairstyle[,] or their
ethnic background."); Larry Gabriel, Joining the Fight, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Aug. 10,
2011),
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/joining-the-fight/Content?oid=2148184
(describing the War on Drugs and the racist, flawed drug policies that targeted
minorities); German Lopez, Nixon Official: Real Reason for the Drug War Was to
Criminalize Black People and Hippies, Vox (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:05 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2016/3/22/11278760/war-on-drugs-racism-nixon (characterizing
the policy to criminalize marijuana as a "ploy to undermine Nixon's political
opposition - meaning, black people and critics of the Vietnam War").

51 Dan Baum, Legalize It All,

HARPER'S MAG.

(Apr. 2016), http://harpers.org/

archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all.
52 Audio tape: Meeting with Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, Oval Office
Conversation No. 693-1 (Mar. 24, 1972, 3:02 PM-3:39 PM) [hereinafter Audio tape:
No. 693-1] ("1 ... oppose the legalization of marijuana, and that includes the sale, its
possession, and its use.... That is my position, despite what the commission has
recommended.")(on file with the Nixon Presidential Library); Audio tape: Meeting
with Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, Oval Office Conversation No. 568-4 (Sept. 9,
1971, 3:03 PM-3:34 PM) ("I have a strong firm convictions [sic] which I have
expressed and which I won't change . . . about legalizing . .. [and] my attitude toward
penalties on marijuana, is . . . very powerful. ... [WIe're going to have a commission
report, I said, [unintelligible] can be very clear, whatever it says, I'm against
legalizing.... I'm against legalizing, period.")(on file with the Nixon Presidential
Library).
53 See infra Section II.A (discussing challenges to the constitutionality of
maintaining marijuana in Schedule 1).
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marijuana, as evidenced by both Congress's initial placement and
reluctance to reclassify.54 Second, a lack of consensus among experts
about the potential medical benefits of marijuana has discouraged
courts from deciding cases on unfounded policy grounds.55 In theory,
the gaps in federal policy pertaining to marijuana afford states the
opportunity to regulate it themselves.5 6
3.

Federal and State Governments Cooperate to Effectively
Regulate Substances with Potentially Harmful Effects

The CSA is not the only means of regulating potentially harmful
commodities. As far back as the mid-1800s, the federal government
has monitored the food and drug industries.57 Specifically, Congress
established the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and assigned
it the task of overseeing medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and food
products.58 Furthermore, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
5
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2018) (stating that "unless specifically excepted or
unless listed in another schedule," marijuana will remain a Schedule I drug); United
States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (referring to
constitutionality challenges of the Schedule I classification as "policy issues for
Congress to revisit if it chooses"); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005)
(surmising Congress's intent from the plain language of the statute); United States v.
Burton, 894 F.2d 188, 192 (6th Cir. 1990) (arguing that Congress should determine
marijuana's schedule classification, not the courts); United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d
440, 450 (7th Cir. 1984) (" [T]he proper statutory classification of marijuana is an
issue that is reserved to the judgment of Congress . . . ."); United States v. Middleton,
690 F.2d 820, 823 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court
should reclassify marijuana because the court does not want to "interfere with the
broad judicially-recognized prerogative of Congress").
55 See, e.g., United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 548 (8th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that the "ongoing vigorous dispute" over marijuana's medical benefits and
psychological and physiological effects support its Schedule I classification); United
States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1973) (declining to contravene the
language in the CSA because "the present state of knowledge of the effects of
mari[j uana is still incomplete and marked by much disagreement and controversy");
Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1008-09 (positing that continued disagreements "among
reputable scientists and practitioners" concerning marijuana's effects suggest that
"Congress could still rationally choose one side of the debate over the other");
Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("The ongoing
dispute regarding the safety and usefulness of marijuana, both as a medical aid and
otherwise, supports the rationality of the Act.").
56 See infra notes 64, 66-68, 74, and accompanying text (explaining that in
reality,
the GCA prevents states from exercising this opportunity).
57 See Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2018)) (delegating the U.S. Department of Agriculture authority to regulate
drugs).
58 Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
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and Explosives ("ATF") implements enforcement policies governing
harmful substances such as alcohol and tobacco;59 whereas the
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau ("TTB"), an extension of
the U.S. Department of Treasury, oversees federal taxation. 60
In addition to federal regulation, state governments also retain a role
in governing alcohol and tobacco. First, alcohol has been a primary
source of state revenue since the legislature enacted the first liquor tax
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2018)); John P. Swann, FDA's Origin, FDA
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/forgshistory/evolvingpowers/ucml24
403.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (discussing the purposes of the FDA). For
example, the federal government imposes regulations on pharmaceutical drugs by
mandating clinical trials for new drug applicants. See FDA Modernization Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282(i) (2018)).
39 See 6 U.S.C. § 531(c) (2018); Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Bureau,
FED.
REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/alcohol-tobacco-firearms-andexplosives-bureau (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (explaining that the ATF "works, directly
and through partnerships, to investigate and reduce violent crime involving firearms
and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products");
see also Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 138
(D.D.C. 1980) ("The specific exemption of alcohol and tobacco from the provisions of
the CSA reflects Congress's view that other regulatory schemes are more appropriate
for alcohol and tobacco.").
60 About: Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/ttb.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2018)
(noting that the TTB "enforces and administers laws covering the production,
distribution, and use of alcohol and tobacco products and collects excise taxes on
alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and ammunition" in addition to creating and enforcing tax
policies associated with the alcohol and tobacco industries). Taxes on alcohol vary
depending on the type of alcohol; for example, different tax rates are implemented for
beer, wine, and distilled spirits. Tax and Fee Rates, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE
BUREAU, https://www.ttb.gov/tax audit/atftaxes.shtml (last updated Jan. 17, 2018).
Tax rates for wine are also broken down further, with differing rates for wine with
14% alcohol or less, 14-21% alcohol, over 21-24% alcohol, and differing rates for
naturally sparkling wine, artificially carbonated wine, and hard cider. Id. Tax rates for
tobacco also differ depending on the type of tobacco products; small cigarettes, large
cigarettes, small cigars, large cigars, pipe tobacco, chewing tobacco, snuff, and rollyour-own tobacco all have their own tax rates. Id. During fiscal year 2011, TTB
collected $24 billion in excise taxes and other revenues from the alcohol, tobacco, and
firearms and ammunition industries. See ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU,
FY 2013: PRESIDENT'S BUDGET SUBMISSION 4 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/
about/budget-performance/Documents/9%20-%20FY%202013%20TTB%20CJ.pdf.
Each year, the alcohol beverage industry in the United States "pays $7.6 billion in
federal excise taxes . . . and also provides a source of tax revenue for state and local
governments." Id. at 6. Additionally, in fiscal year 2011, "TTB tobacco excise tax
collections reached $15.5 billion as a result of the increased tax rate imposed by the
Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA)." Id. at
7. Due to the increase in the price of tobacco products as a result of the increased tax
rates, tax revenues on tobacco are expected to decline along with consumption,
resulting in an increase in illicit trade. Id.
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in 1791.61 After a short lull during the prohibition era, regulators
reinvigorated the need to cede control to state governments. 62 Each
state now has at least one agency that oversees the taxation of
alcohol. 63 Specifically, states and municipalities have the option to
control, license, or, in some cases, completely ban distribution
through their administrative agencies. 64 Moreover, states may also levy
taxes on tobacco without undermining the federal government's $1.01
blanket excise tax. 65 Therefore, alcohol and tobacco provide examples
of when both federal and state regulatory arms cooperate to monitor a
harmful substance.
Likewise, states that have legalized the recreational use of marijuana
have adopted an approach mirroring that of alcohol and tobacco. 66
61

See MELISSA BIANCHI ET AL., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, STATE ALCOHOL

TAXES & HEALTH: A CITIZEN'S ACTION GUIDE 4 (1996).

62 Historical Overview,
NAT'L
ALCOHOL
BEVERAGE
CONTROL
Assoc.,
http://www.nabca.org/history (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (recognizing that the United
States is "too large and too diverse to accept a single standard of sobriety").
63 See BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 61, at 7; see also Jared Walczak, How High Are
Beer Taxes in Your State?, TAX FOUND. (June 7, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/beertaxes-state (listing the excise tax rate on beer in each state).
64 See Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the Three-Tiered System as a Control of Marketing
Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT

IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31, 33-34 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008). In
control states, the government retains "management of distribution and retail" of alcohol,
essentially creating a state-run monopoly. Id. at 13. In contrast, in license states, private
entities obtain licenses from the government to distribute alcohol. Id. at 13-14. See
generally Hunter Schwarz, Where in the United States You Can't Purchase Alcohol, WASH.
POST (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/02/
where-in-the-united-states-you-cant-purchase-alcohol (comparing the differences between
counties that are "dry," "partially dry," and "wet" in their alcohol regulation).
65 Ann Boonn, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/
factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf (identifying tobacco taxes as one of the most predictable
sources of state revenue). State tax rates vary: Virginia taxes tobacco the least - at
$0.30 per pack - while New York taxes tobacco the most - at $4.35 per pack. Id.
Additionally, individual cities may choose to tax tobacco at an even higher rate than
states. Id. (providing that Chicago imposes a $6.16 excise tax, compared to Illinois,
which imposes a $1.98 excise tax).
66 See Nicole Flatow, Six Ways Colorado Will Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol,
THINKPROGRESS (May 29, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/
(noting the
05/29/2070641/five-ways-colorado-will-regulate-marijuana-like-alcohol
similarities between the retail of marijuana and the retail of alcohol, such as limiting
who may obtain a license to distribute marijuana, establishing state oversight and
testing of marijuana, and implementing regulations to combat driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of marijuana); see also Benjamin M. Leff, Tax Benefits of
Government-Owned Marijuana Stores, 50 UC DAVIS L. REv. 659, 664 (2016)
(contending that "many states have experimented with state control of liquor sales,
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The Colorado Constitution demonstrates this resemblance, even
explicitly suggesting in one provision that "the use of marijuana
should be . . . taxed in a manner similar to alcohol." 67 First, at a local
level, municipalities maintain the option to control, license, or
completely ban the retail of marijuana. 68 For example, the distribution
of marijuana is popular in the Denver metro area; however, 228 out of
321 municipalities in Colorado have "opted out" of marijuana
commercialization. 69 Second, states have established government
but there are reasons to believe that marijuana may be significantly more suited to a
state-controlled market than alcohol").
67 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 1(a).
68 See, e.g., id. § 16, cl. 5(f) ("A locality may prohibit the operation of marijuana
cultivation facilities, marijuana product manufacturing facilities, marijuana testing
facilities, or retail marijuana stores through the enactment of an ordinance or through
an initiated or referred measure."); Measure 91 (Or. 2014) (approving the Control,
Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, § 60 (Or. 2014))
("The governing body of a city or a county ... shall order an election on the question
whether the operation of licensed premises shall be prohibited in the city or county.").
Note that while the process to legalize marijuana varies by state, all states do require a
number of checks on any proposal before an initiative appears on a general election
ballot. For example, in Colorado, the proponent of a constitutional amendment must
submit it to the legislative council for a public review and comment hearing, receive a
threshold number of valid signatures, and achieve a majority of the vote on a general
election ballot. See Statement of Sufficiency: Proposed Initiative 2011-2012 #30, COLO.
DEP'T ST. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/
ballot/Statements/2012/SufficiencyProp30.pdf. Amendment 64 - which proposed to
legalize marijuana - received 90,466 initial signatures and passed the general election
ballot in 2012 upon receiving just over 55% of the vote. See Colorado Marijuana
Legalization Initiative: Amendment 64, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado
MarijuanaLegalizationInitiative,_Amendment_64_(2012) (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
Washington enacts a similar procedure but requires fewer signatures. See Filing
Initiatives and Referenda in Washington State, WASH. SECRETARY ST.,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/electibns/initiatives/initiative%20and%20referenda%2
Ohandbook%202017%20.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). Ballot Initiative 502,
legalizing marijuana in Washington, also passed by just over 55% of the vote in 2012.
See Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/WashingtonMarijuanaLegalization-andRegulation, Initiativ
e_502_(2012) (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). For more details on how recreational
marijuana has become legal in Oregon, Alaska, California, Massachusetts, and the
District of Columbia, see generally History of Marijuana on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/History-of marijuana-on the ballot (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
69 See John Aguilar, MarijuanaGap Divides Colorado Towns that Sell Pot, Those that
Don't, DENVER POST (Jan. 1, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/01/01/
marijuana-gap-divides-colorado-towns-that-sell-pot-those-that-dont
(describing the
tension between "communities friendly to the sale of recreational marijuana" and
communities that are "totally pot-shop-free" as a "David-and-Goliath dynamic");
Clarissa Cooper, Colorado Profits, but Still Divided on Legal Weed, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Aug. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/08/16/
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agencies to regulate and enforce the retail and consumption of
tax schemes
marijuana. 70 Third, states have promulgated
administering how much to excise and whom the proceeds should
benefit.7 1 In fact, substantial state revenue from marijuana taxes has
poured into states like Colorado, which has allocated about $40
17841/colorado-profits-still-divided-legal-weed; see also Amendment 64 Allows for the
Local Governments to Regulate the Marijuana Industry, SMART COLO.,
http://smartcolorado.org/city-county-status (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (listing, by
county, the jurisdictions within Colorado and whether each permits or prohibits the
sale of marijuana). Compare Rosemary McClure, Exploring Colorado's Cannabis
Tourism Scene in Denver, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016, 6:30 AM),
(providing
http://www.latimes.com/travel/la-tr-colorado-20160824-snap-story.html
that tourists can sign up for culinary classes in which marijuana is the main
ingredient), with Colorado Towns Opting out of Retail Marijuana Sales, with Good
Reasons, GAZETTE (Aug. 11, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://gazette.com/colorado-towns(forecasting
opting-out-of-retail-marijuana-sales-with-good-reasons/article/1504705
that "potential markets for over-the-counter pot sales ... are quickly dwindling").
Furthermore, one municipality in particular, North Bonneville, Washington, has
elected to retain control over its retail of marijuana, creating the first governmentowned marijuana shop in the country. Evan Bush, Here's a First: Tiny Town Will Open
Its

Own

Pot

Shop,

SEATTLE

TIMEs

(Mar.

5,

2015,

7:45

PM),

http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/heres-a-first-tiny-town-will-open-its-ownpot-shop; see also Leff, supra note 66, at 661 (contending that governments electing to
retain control of marijuana dispensaries "solve[] the federal income tax problem faced
by [private] marijuana sellers" and avoid the conflict posed between federal and state
tax provisions).
70 See,
e.g.,
About
the
OLCC,
OR.
LIQUOR
CONTROL
COMM'N,
(last visited Apr. 4, 2018)
http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/Pages/about-us.aspx
(explaining that the "Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) is the agency
responsible for regulating the sale and service of alcoholic beverages in Oregon by
administering the state's Liquor Control Act and regulating the sale of recreational
marijuana"); FAQs on Taxes, WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD,
http://www.liq.wa.gov/mj2015/faqs-on-taxes (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (describing the
Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board's influence on taxes and the questions
typically asked by the public); Marijuana Enforcement, COLO. DEP'T REVENUE,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (last visited Apr.
4, 2018) (designating the "Marijuana Enforcement Division" of the Colorado
Department of Revenue to administer and enforce medical and retail marijuana laws
and regulation).
71 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 5(d) (directing an "excise tax to be levied
upon marijuana sold or otherwise transferred by a marijuana cultivation facility to a
marijuana product manufacturing facility"); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535 (2018)
(detailing the allocation of revenue from the marijuana excise tax to measures such as
a youth drug prevention, research, and public education program voted into law from
Washington Initiative Measure No. 502, § 27). Oregon established a separate Oregon
Marijuana Account, which receives the marijuana taxes that the Department of
Revenue collects and distributes a specific percentage of funds to other accounts such
as the Common School Fund, Mental Health Alcoholism and Drug Services Account,
and the State Police Account. H.B. 2041, 78th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2015).
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million of its $79 million in marijuana tax revenue to constructing
new schools and funding youth programs. 72 Despite reported medical
benefits and the enormous revenue that the taxation of marijuana on
the state level generates, marijuana remains a Schedule I drug in the
eyes of the federal government.
C.

The Federal and State Interplay of Marijuana:Section 922(g) (3)

The clash between state decriminalization and continued federal
criminalization of marijuana has presented a variety of issues that arise
when federal agencies enforce its marijuana policy in states that have
legalized the drug.73 In some instances, lawful marijuana use under
state law may disqualify individuals from certain rights or benefits
under federal law.7 4 For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and

Cooper, supranote 69; Molly Jackson, Colorado to Send Extra MarijuanaRevenue
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Education/2015/1109/Colorado-to-send-extra-marijuana-revenue-to-schools
(praising
state policy that apportioned "$40 million ... to school construction, $2.5 million to
drug education, and another $2 million to other youth programs"). Breaking down the
27.9% marijuana tax in Colorado, the aggregate is comprised of 2.9% state Colorado
sales tax, "10% marijuana sales tax," and "15% excise tax on the average market rate
of retail marijuana." See Robert W. Wood, Marijuana Tax up in Smoke? Don't Worry,
Feds Plot 50% Tax, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/robertwood/2015/02/16/marijuana-tax-up-in-smoke-dont-worry-feds-plot-50tax/2/#745a89375797. Washington's Office of Financial Management has predicted
that the state's marijuana tax will bring in more than $1 billion in the four years
beginning in July 2015. See Kate Smith, Washington Expects Pot Sales Tax Revenue
Surge to $1 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2015, 7:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/20 15-10-23/washington-expects-pot-sales-tax-revenue-surge-to- 1-billion.
"In its first full year of sales, from July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016, Washington state
collected $62 million in marijuana excise taxes, $10 million in state sales taxes, $1.3
million in state [business and occupation] taxes, and $3.6 million in local sales
taxes. . . ." See Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Morgan Scarboro, MarijuanaLegalization
and Taxes: Lessons for Other States from Colorado and Washington, TAX FOUND. (May
12, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/marijuana-taxes-lessons-colorado-washington.
Similarly, Oregon experienced a surge in tax revenue; the state began taxing marijuana
sales on February 1, 2016, and reported $3.48 million in tax revenue from February 1
to March 4, with 40% going to education efforts. See Julia Zorthian, OregonJust Made
$3.48 Million from Marijuana, TIME (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4263411/oregonmarijuana-tax-revenue.
73 For purposes of this Article, "lawful" and "unlawful" marijuana use is defined
according to the law of a particular jurisdiction. For instance, in Colorado, "lawful"
marijuana use includes both medicinal and recreational use. However, in Florida,
"lawful" marijuana use only includes medicinal use.
74 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a), (b)(1), (c)(1) (2018) (allowing the owners of
federal public housing to deny tenancy to individuals who were previously evicted for
drug-related criminal activity, who are currently using controlled substances, or
72

to Schools,
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Urban Development ("HUD") requires landlords to evict any federally
assisted tenant who is using marijuana, "even if [marijuana use] is
permitted under state law."75 Therefore, federal agencies inconsistently
interpret and enforce the CSA, struggling to reconcile the conflict
posed between state and federal law pertaining to marijuana.
The GCA provides another wearisome example of the conflict
between the lawful use of marijuana under state law and unlawful use
under federal law. The GCA prohibits any person who is an "unlawful
user of or addicted to any controlled substance," as defined by the
CSA, from possessing "any firearm or ammunition."7 6 Because the
whose household members were involved in any drug-related criminal activity); 49
C.F.R. § 40.151(e)-(g) (2017) (disallowing medical marijuana as "a legitimate medical
explanation" for a federal transportation employee's positive drug test result); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2018) (stating that discharging an employee based
on "lawful" outside-of-work activities is discriminatory and illegal); Coats v. Dish
Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015) (clarifying that "an activity such as
medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a 'lawful' activity
under section 24-34-402.5"). Moreover, because federal regulators penalize financial
institutions that partner with lawful marijuana dispensaries, it is difficult for
marijuana dispensaries to deposit their earnings into federally insured banks. See
Sophie Quinton, Why Marijuana Businesses Still Can't Get Bank Accounts, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/03/22/why-marijuana-businesses-still-cant-get-bankaccounts (identifying that many lawful state marijuana dispensaries cannot open bank
accounts because "federal law prohibits banks and credit unions from taking
marijuana money"). Critics argue that the lack of access to bank accounts incites
violence; dispensaries, storing much of their cash in-house or in warehouses, are
targets for criminals. See David Migoya, Effort to Open Banking System to Legal
Marijuana Businesses Stalls in U.S. House, DENVER POST (June 22, 2016, 2:13 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/06/22/colorado-marijuana-banking-system-stallssenate-house (referring to an armed robbery in a dispensary as "an example [of] why
the marijuana industry needs banking [reform]").
75 See 42 U.S.C.
§ 13662(a) (2018) ("[An owner of federally assisted
housing . . . [may] terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a
member . . . whose illegal use .

.

. of a controlled substance . . . is determined by the

public housing agency or owner to interfere with the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents."); Memorandum from
Benjamin T. Metcalf, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Multifamily Hous. Programs, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. on Use of Marijuana in Multifamily Assisted Properties
(Dec. 29, 2014) (requiring that owners of federally assisted housing "deny admission
to . .. [any individual] determined to be illegally using a controlled substance (e.g.,
marijuana)"). Alternatively, in other certain circumstances, lawful marijuana use
under state law may not disqualify individuals entitled to benefits under federal law.
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 249, 129
Stat. 2332, 2332-33 (asserting that the funds given to the Department of Veterans
Affairs can be used in a way that would "interfere with the ability of a veteran to
participate in a State-approved medical marijuana program").
76 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2018).

2018]

Guns N' Ganja

1803

CSA places marijuana in Schedule I, the GCA bars marijuana users
from possessing firearms or ammunition.7 7 After states began
legalizing recreational marijuana, the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ") issued a memorandum in an effort to prevent any confusion
and evinced its intention to continue prosecuting individuals under
§ 922(g)(3).78
Accordingly, individuals who lawfully possess
marijuana under state law are "unlawful users" under the GCA,
thereby forfeiting their right to possess a firearm.
Legislative history often clarifies ambiguous terms in a statute;
however, the legislative history of the GCA sheds no such light on the
meaning of an "unlawful user." 79 Congress's goal in enacting the GCA
is seemingly broad: it sought to "fight against crime and violence"
without "discourag[ing] or eliminat[ing] the private ownership or use
of firearms by law-abiding citizens."8 0 The only guidance Congress
furnished was its intention to "make it a little harder for drug addicts,
muggers, deranged individuals, and other criminal elements to
procure handguns." 81 In fact, the Supreme Court has inferred from the
legislative history that Congress's goal was to simply "keep firearms
82
out of the hands of 'presumptively risky people."'

77 See id.; Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2018) (defining a
"controlled substance" as a substance "included in [S]chedule I, 1I, III, IV, or V").
78 See § 922(g)(3) (criminalizing concurrent possession of drugs and a firearm).
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice on
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29,
2013) (advising all United States Attorneys to continue following the CSA and
disregard any state laws to the contrary, regarding marijuana in particular). On April
5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions reemphasized this goal, indicating that the
Trump administration will "undertake a review of existing policies in the areas of
charging, sentencing, and marijuana to ensure consistency with the Department's
overall strategy on reducing violent crime . . . ." Memorandum from Jeff Sessions,
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice on Update on the Task Force on Crime Reduction
and Public Safety to All Heads of Department Components and United States
Attorneys (Apr. 5, 2017).
79 United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Neither
[§] 922([g]) (3) nor its legislative history provides a definition of 'unlawful user."').
80 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213-14; see also
Lynn Murtha & Suzanne L. Smith, "An Ounce of Prevention. . .": Restriction Versus
Proaction in American Gun Violence Policies, 10 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 205, 211,
220 (1994) (purporting that the GCA "represented a major effort on the part of the
federal government to curb growing use of firearms in violent crimes," but doubting
whether it has "any effect on reducing existing crime").
81 132 CONG. REC. H1689-03 (1986).
82 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 n.6 (1983); see also
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (deducing that the GCA "sought
broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially
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Legislative history is equally unhelpful in reconciling the conflict
between state legalization and federal prohibition of marijuana
consumption. Courts have noted the absence of any guidance from
Congress, presumably illuminating Congress's failure to anticipate
such a conflict. 83 The only instructive guidance must be deduced from
subsequent amendments to the GCA. As originally enacted in 1968,
the GCA did not mention marijuana or the potential interplay between
the possession of a firearm and the lawful consumption of marijuana.8 4
In October of 1968, however, Congress amended the GCA to expand
its scope and specifically capture users of marijuana - but no other
drug - in its dragnet. 85 Finally, in 1986, Congress again amended the
GCA to reflect its current iteration: Congress removed any mention of
marijuana and ambiguously prohibited any "unlawful user of or
addicted to any controlled substance" from possessing "any firearm or
ammunition." 86 Confusion has since spread, causing courts, legal
scholars, and citizens to struggle to understand the law and the
breadth of law enforcement's prosecutorial discretion.8 7
The ambiguity in the GCA and Congress's failure to clarify it forced
lower courts to fashion a judicial test to determine the GCA's
prosecutorial scope. In an attempt to clarify the scope of the GCA and

irresponsible and dangerous"). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's interpretation,
lower courts have expressed confusion and frustration with the ambiguous language
of the statute. See United States v. Freitas, 59 M.J. 755, 757 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2004) (criticizing the opacity of the statute and noting that "[w]e are left only with the
vague statement in the Senate Report that Congress intended to keep guns out of the
hands of those who have criminal backgrounds"); Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058,
1065 (Cal. 2011) (explaining that the GCA was designed "to keep firearms out of the
hands of 'presumptively risky people"').
83 James v. City of Costa Mesa, 684 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2012) ("There is not
one word in the statute or in the legislative history suggesting that Congress sought to
exclude from the definition of illegal drug use the use of a controlled substance that
was lawful under state law but unlawful and unauthorized under federal law.").
84 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 922(f), 82 Stat. 197, 231 (prohibiting "any person who is under indictment or who
has been convicted [of a felony]" from possessing any firearm or ammunition).
85 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(g), 82 Stat. 1213, 1221
2
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 9 2(g)(3) (2018)) (prohibiting any "unlawful user of or
addicted to mari[j]uana" from possessing any firearm or ammunition).
86 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 452 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)).
87 See Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Marijuana Today: A Mixed Bag, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
14, 2016), https://www.bna.com/marijuana-today-mixed-b57982076978 (noting the
confusion that the conflict between marijuana policies of the federal government and
the states caused, but suggesting that a "growing acceptance of marijuana will
eventually resolve all the mixed messages").
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define "unlawful user," courts confined their focus on two factors: (1)
the regularity of the drug use, and (2) the contemporaneous
possession of the drug and firearm.88 The judiciary's test is
tautological, however. While the test seeks to define unlawful user, it
fails to expressly include unlawful use in its analysis; 89 courts solely
focus on the "judicially created temporal nexus" between gun
possession and drug use.90 By conflating an element of the analysis
with the analysis itself, courts omit the integral factor of unlawful
use. 91 Therefore, the test is more aptly characterized as (1) the
unlawful possession or use of a drug, pursuant to the CSA; (2) the
regularity of the drug use; and (3) the contemporaneous possession of
the drug and a firearm.
Even assuming the drug at issue is "unlawful" under the CSA, the
judicially created test fails to implicate three types of risky individuals.
First, the test permits an individual to simultaneously consume
methamphetamine and operate a firearm, so long as he is merely an
occasional
user
of
methamphetamine.
Although
the
methamphetamine user is consuming a dangerous, mind-altering
substance, he does not use the drug with "regularity." Second, the test
permits an individual who regularly consumes methamphetamine to

88 See United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]o be an
unlawful user, one needed to have engaged in regular use over a period of time
proximate to or contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm."); United States
v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Tio sustain a conviction under
§ 922(g)(3), the government must prove ... that the defendant took drugs with
regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with
his . . . possession of a firearm.").
89 See Purdy, 264 F.3d at 811 (noting that "the term 'unlawful user' was not
defined in the statute or its legislative history," and analyzing only the
contemporaneousness and regularity of the defendant's drug use).
90 United States v. Turnbull, 349 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 2003).
91 There are two problems with the judicially created test. First, the test created
confusion in the judiciary: the test pays mere lip service to "unlawful use" and focuses
on regularity and contemporaneousness to eliminate any ambiguities, yet this
definition accomplishes anything but clarity. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 431
F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting defendant's contention that § 922(g)(3)
violates the Second Amendment and is vague and overbroad); Purdy, 264 F.3d at 812
(rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge to § 922(g)(3) where defendant's "drug use
was sufficiently consistent, 'prolonged,'. and close in time to his gun possession to put
him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs"). Indeed, it defines
"unlawful use" as regular drug use and contemporaneousness - essentially as helpful
as defining a "dog" as a creature with fur. Second, the test fails to prosecute dangerous
criminals: the scope of the test fails to include dangerous individuals, such as a cartel
member trafficking heroin, as long as he does not make a "regular" habit out of it. See
infra Section II.B.
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operate a firearm, so long as he does not consume methamphetamine
on the day he operates the firearm. Undoubtedly, an individual who
consistently consumes methamphetamine is the type of person
predisposed to dangerous behavior, but he may operate a firearm so
long as he is not under the influence at that moment. Lastly, the test
permits an individual who frequently traffics methamphetamine to
operate a firearm so long as he does not consume that
methamphetamine. As illustrated, the test's prosecutorial scope is very
narrow; it implicates only an individual who regularly consumes
drugs, is currently under the influence of that drug, and
simultaneously possesses a firearm.
Challengers have argued that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional on
various grounds. First, while a statute that restricts gun use naturally
implicates the Second Amendment, courts have consistently held that
§ 922(g)(3) does not violate an individual's right to bear arms. 92
Second, defendants have contended that the criminal statute is
unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define the criminal offense
with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"; courts have regularly
rejected this argument, however.93 Third, in response to various
Supremacy Clause challenges, courts have disagreed on whether the
CSA preempts state legalization of marijuana. 94 The Supremacy Clause
92 See United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that
922(g)(3) proportionally advances the government's legitimate goal of preventing
gun violence and is therefore constitutional under the Second Amendment"); United
States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding § 922(g)(3)
against a Second Amendment challenge because Congress may constitutionally
prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms); United States v. Yancey, 621
F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that Congress acted constitutionally when
it enacted § 922(g)(3) because "prohibiting illegal drug users from firearm
possession . .. is substantially related to the important governmental interest in
preventing violent crime").
93 Patterson, 431 F.3d at 836 (quoting United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 776 (5th
Cir. 1996)); see also Turnbull, 349 F.3d at 561 (rejecting a void-for-vagueness
challenge to § 922(g)(3) where defendant's "drug use was sufficiently consistent,
'prolonged,' and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he
qualified as an unlawful user of drugs"); United States v. Edwards, 182 F.3d 333, 33536 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the application of § 922(g)(3) was constitutional
because an ordinary person would understand that the defendant's actions - being in
possession of marijuana three different times when confronted by police, being in
possession of cocaine, and admitting use of marijuana, while possessing a firearm
establish him as an unlawful user of a controlled substance while in possession of a
firearm).
94 Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (reaffirming

-

"§

2018]

Guns N' Ganja

1807

states that federal law generally supersedes state law, but the CSA also
has an explicit preemption clause limiting Congress's authority to
preclude state action in this area.95 Lastly, the law has been challenged
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering Clause,
which prohibits the federal government from compelling state actors
to enforce federal laws in certain situations; however, these challenges
have only been minimally successful.96
II.

READY, AIM, FIRE: THE CLASSIFICATION OF MARIJUANA MISSES THE
TARGET AND WOUNDS FEDERALISM

Unsurprisingly, the decriminalization of recreational marijuana by
state governments along with the reassurance of its criminality by the
that even if a state law authorizes the use of marijuana, the state law is "without
effect" if it conflicts with federal law), and Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113,
123 (D.D.C. 2001) (confirming that taking measures to enforce the CSA is within
lawful federal government authority regardless of any conflicting state law), with
Kirby v. County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (deciding
that "it is possible for local law enforcement agencies and officers to comply with their
obligation not to arrest persons with valid [medical marijuana] identification cards
and comply with the CSA" and that "the [CSA] does not require local law
enforcement officers to arrest persons who possess or cultivate marijuana"), and Willis
v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058, 1068 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (holding that state law
enforcement officers cannot refuse to issue a concealed handgun license to an
individual simply because he used medical marijuana in violation of federal law but in
compliance with state law).
95 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . .. shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding); 21 U.S.C. § 903
(2018) (asserting that Congress does not intend to preempt any relevant state law
"unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together"); see also TODD GARVEY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE,
FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE & FEDERAL LAWs 9 (2012) (explaining
that a conflict between the CSA and a state law only exists when "it is 'physically
impossible' to comply with both the state and federal law," or when the state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress"); infra note 137 (explaining that despite a preemption
argument, federal and state marijuana laws can in fact coexist, but clarifying that the
discussion becomes entirely moot if the federal government deschedules marijuana).
96

U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."); see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (deeming
portions of the GCA amendments requiring interim immediate background checks
unconstitutional); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(detailing that a general presumption against federal preemption is raised when a law
restrains the "historic police powers of States").
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federal government has elicited mass confusion. The national
conversation surrounding marijuana, whether involving laymen or
legal scholars, raises the same question: is marijuana actually legal?
Indeed, uncertainty has now spread across the country, affecting
states, like California and Massachusetts, that just recently legalized
recreational marijuana.9 7 Notwithstanding the opportunity for
constitutional scholars to sift through principles of federalism, the
resolution requires a practical solution; the federal government, by
continuing to prosecute individuals with related violations, may
eliminate federal entitlements from millions of unsuspecting American
citizens who legally smoke marijuana in a state that endorses its
consumption. 98
Individuals who lawfully smoke marijuana risk losing their right to
own a firearm or federal entitlements, such as federal housing
subsidies, because marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug. 99 This
continued classification is inappropriate, however. President Nixon
placed marijuana in Schedule 1, ignoring expert recommendations
advocating for reclassification, and instead relied upon racially
prejudiced motivations. 00 Additionally, justifying marijuana's
97 See Ben Gilbert, 4 States Just Voted to Make MarijuanaCompletely Legal -Here's
What We Know, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 8:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/marijuana-states-legalized-weed-2016-11/#1-massachusetts-1 (reporting that, in
addition to California and Massachusetts, Nevada and Maine also completely legalized
recreational marijuana - meaning its use, sale, and consumption).
98 Cf. Medical MarijuanaPatient Numbers, MARIJUANA POL'Y PROJECT (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-state-medical-marijuana-laws/
medical-marijuana-patient-numbers (estimating that 2,254,782 "state-legal patients"
consume medical marijuana in the United States). Although polls vary on the number of
actual users in the states that have legalized recreational marijuana, the sales numbers
provide a better picture. In 2015, the state of Colorado sold $996.2 million in legal
medical and recreational marijuana. Tom Huddleston, Jr., Colorado's Legal Marijuana
Industry Is Worth $1
Billion, FORTUNE (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:19 AM),
http://fortune.com/2016/02/11/marijuana-billion-dollars-colorado. Pundits predict that
Colorado, which has collected millions of dollars in tax revenue already, will surpass the
$1 billion mark in sales in 2016. Id. Moreover, some research predicts that sales in the
United States could approach $22 billion in sales by 2020. Id. Clearly, the conflict
involving state legality and federal illegality will only be exacerbated as more states
choose to legalize marijuana consumption.
99 See,
e.g.,
Colorado: Marijuana-Federal Implications, COLORADO.GOV,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/marijuana/federal-implications (last visited Apr. 4,
2018).
100 See Lopez, supra note 50 ("The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White
House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people... . We knew we
couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public
to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities." (quotingJohn Ehrlichman)).
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continued placement in Schedule I remains difficult when an
abundance of research demonstrates its various medical benefits and
defies a misperception that marijuana causes violent behavior. 0 1
Further, a nationwide regulatory scheme is unnecessary to fulfill
Congress's initial intent for § 922(g)(3): to prevent presumptively
dangerous people from possessing firearms. Section 922(g)(3) is overinclusive because it targets lawful marijuana users without violent
tendencies; it is under-inclusive because it fails to target riskier, more
violent individuals. Maintaining marijuana in Schedule I also
effectively silences any state input regarding its regulation.
Consequently, there are other, more effective ways to regulate
marijuana - for example, mimicking the regulatory schemes of
alcohol and tobacco - that would avoid the conflict with § 922(g)(3)
altogether.
A.

MarijuanaDoes Not Belong in Schedule I

Although courts have consistently upheld the Schedule I
classification of marijuana, vigorous debate persists within law and
medicine as to whether the classification remains appropriate. First,
transcripts from President Nixon's administration evinced a racially
driven motive for originally placing marijuana in Schedule I. Despite
numerous reports rebutting marijuana's harmful effects, the
administration ignored any recommendations to reclassify. Second,
current data also suggests potential benefits of marijuana prompting
twenty-eight independent sovereigns - twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia - to undergo the extensive process of amending
their states' laws to legalize marijuana. Accordingly, not only was the
initial placement of marijuana in Schedule I misguided, but its
continued classification also has no compelling justifications.
1.

Backward Looking: Marijuana Never Should Have Been Placed
in Schedule I

To influence new legislation, marijuana advocates all over the
country have been protesting marijuana's Schedule I classification;10 2
101 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the untenable correlation
between marijuana use and violence).
102 See, e.g., Nick Buffo, ProtestersPush for Legalizing Marijuanaat Annual Festival,
WKOW 27 (Oct. 17, 2016, 11:48 PM), http://www.wkow.com/story/33299621/2016/
(detailing a
1/Sunday/protesters-push-for-legalizing-marijuana-at-annual-festival
protest for legalization in Madison, Wisconsin at the "46th annual Madison Hemp
Festival"); Bailey Cline, ProtestersGather in Dunn Meadow for Legalization Rally, IND.
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however, this contentious debate began over forty years ago. During
the floor debates for the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, Congress was considering the appropriate schedule
classification for marijuana. 103 Dr. Stanley F. Yolles testified to
Congress that marijuana does not cause many of the dangerous
psychotropic and physical effects that some had feared.104 In addition
to Dr. Yolles' testimony, Congress commissioned a report, seeking a
recommendation for the appropriate scheduling of marijuana. 05
Although the commission did not recommend broad legalization, it
also did not recommend classifying marijuana in Schedule 1.106
The Commission's recommendation to decriminalize possession of
marijuana, coupled with the Senate's legislative bills to legalize it, flies
in the face of the Nixon Administration's ultimate placement of
marijuana in Schedule 1.107 President Nixon sacrificed the integrity of
the presidency to exploit his authority under the CSA and advance a
policy cloaked in bigotry.108 President Nixon's advisor, John

DAILY STUDENT (Oct. 30, 2016, 8:49 PM), http://www.idsnews.com/article/2016/10/

a
protest
in
(describing
marijuana-legalization-rally-held-in-dunn-meadow
Bloomington, Indiana, where supporters gathered around 4:20 PM to voice their
support for legalization); Erika Ferrando, Issue 7 Supporters Protest in Front of Ark.
Supreme Court, THV11 (Oct. 28, 2016, 6:25 PM), http://www.thvll.com/news/local/
issue-7-supporters-protest-in-front-of-ark-supreme-court/343985288 (reporting on a
protest for the legalization of medical marijuana in Little Rock, Arkansas, after
officials removed the potential amendment from the upcoming election ballot).
103 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 4577-80 (1970).
104 See id. at 4578 (1970) (advocating that "marilj]uana does not cause physical
addiction"); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
105

See generally THE

NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA

& DRUG

ABUSE,

supra note 46, at 6.

See id. ("[Wie recommend only a decriminalization of possession
mari[j]uana for personal use on both the State and Federal levels.").
106

107

THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA

&

DRUG ABUSE,

of

supra note 46, at 6

(recommending that "[plossession of mari[j]uana for personal use would no longer be
an offense"); Nahas & Greenwood, supra note 46, at 55 (contending that "legislation
[had] already been introduced in both houses of Congress" that even went "beyond
the commission's recommendations").
10
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (interviewing President Nixon's top
aide, John Ehrlichman, and expounding on the administration's intention to
criminalize marijuana to "disrupt" African American communities); see also Michael
H. Tonry, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding. By National Commission on
Marihuanaand Drug Abuse, 82 YALE L.J. 1736, 1743 (1973) (suggesting that "President
Nixon's forewarning that he would pay no heed to a recommendation favoring
legalization no doubt inhibited [the commission]"); Audio tape: Meeting with Richard
Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, Oval Office Conversation No. 505-4 (May 26, 1971, 10:03
AM-11:35 AM) ("You know it's a funny thing, every one of the bastards that are out
for legalizing marijuana is Jewish. What the Christ is the matter with the Jews, Bob,
what is the matter with them?"). Not only did President Nixon make disparaging
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Ehrlichman, later admitted that the administration's drug policies
were closely connected to his prejudice against certain minority
groups.1 09 Accordingly, marijuana's initial placement in Schedule I was
motivated by racial animus, and the placement's principal syndicate
deliberately ignored the recommendation of medical professionals and
a congressional commission.
2.

Forward Looking: The Justifications for Marijuana's Placement
in Schedule I Are No Longer Compelling

Although Congress initially classified marijuana as a Schedule I
drug, its continued classification in the most restrictive schedule has
no compelling justifications. Schedule I is reserved only for drugs that
have a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use;1 10
however, current data exonerates marijuana from this inaccurate
label."' Indeed, empirical studies refute many of the prevailing myths
about marijuana, demonstrating that marijuana does not foster
dependence or the potential for abuse.11 2 Although the federal
statements about minority groups that typically used marijuana, but his Oval Office
conversations demonstrate that he also sought to improperly influence the
commission's findings and recommendations. See Audio tape: No. 693-1, supra note
52 ("I ... oppose the legalization of marijuana, and that includes the sale, its
possession, and its use... . That is my position, despite what the commission has
recommended.").
109 Lopez, supra note 50 ("The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White
House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. . . . We knew we
couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public
to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities." (quoting John Ehrlichman)).
110 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing the requisites of each
schedule in the CSA).
"Ii Philip M. Boffey, Editorial, What Science Says About Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July
30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/what-science-says-aboutmarijuana.html?-r=0 (emphasizing "the vast gap between antiquated federal law
enforcement policies and the clear consensus of science that marijuana is far less
harmful to human health than most other banned drugs and is less dangerous than the
highly addictive but perfectly legal substances known as alcohol and tobacco").
112 See, e.g., Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("It is
unreasonable to believe that use of medical marijuana . . . will create a significant drug
problem."); Igor Grant et al., Medical Marijuana: Clearing Away the Smoke, 6 OPEN
NEUROLOGY J. 18, 24 (2012) (contending that although marijuana may have some
potential for abuse, it is more accurate to place it in Schedule III, with other drugs that
have significantly higher potential for abuse). Studies have dispelled many of the
myths surrounding marijuana and confirmed that marijuana is neither a narcotic nor
addictive, and, is not generally a gateway drug to more dangerous drugs. See Nat'l Org.
for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 129 (D.D.C. 1980) (citing
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government asserts that marijuana has no current accepted medical
benefit, paradoxically, twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have legalized either recreational or medical marijuana.1 13
Surely, these incongruous views on marijuana can be reconciled in
empirical and anecdotal evidence rather than unsubstantiated
speculation. 114
In addition to empirical evidence, anecdotal evidence also supports
the descheduling of marijuana. Marijuana shares few attributes with
the other drugs listed in Schedule 1.115 For instance, marijuana and
heroin are both in Schedule I, yet heroin is a highly addictive drug that
causes overdose at an alarmingly high rate.11 6 Furthermore,
marijuana's medical benefits are well-established and far-reaching:
patients use it to help treat conditions ranging from anxiety and
LESTER GRINSPOON, MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED: THE MOST THOROUGH EVALUATION OF
THE BENEFITS & DANGERS OF CANNABIS 230-322 (2d ed. 1977)) (asserting that
marijuana causes neither aggressive behavior nor insanity); see also GLEN HANSON ET
AL., DRUGS AND SOCIETY 387 (6th ed. 2000) (noting that factors such as personality and

social environment are much more important factors for determining whether a
person will move on to harder drugs).
113 State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/govdatalstate-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
114 See generally Grant et al., supra note 112, at 18-19 (detailing studies that
indicate that marijuana helps stimulate appetite in patients with anorexia, cancer, or
HIV/AIDS and generally helps alleviate nausea and chronic pain). A series of clinical
trials has demonstrated that cannabis significantly reduces pain intensity: individuals
suffering from chronic pain reported that their pain intensity decreased by 34-40%
when they consumed marijuana as compared to a 17-20% decrease while using a
placebo. Id. at 19. Furthermore, 52% of the participants reported at least a 30%
decrease in their overall pain when they used cannabis, which is particularly
significant because a 30% "decrease in pain intensity is generally associated with
reports of improved life quality." Id.
115 Congress has placed marijuana on par with drugs such as heroin and acid,
whereas cocaine and meth remain in Schedule II. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2018); see
also United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1973) ("It is apparently true
that there is little or no basis for concluding that mariljluana is as dangerous a
substance as some of the other drugs included in Schedule 1."); Boffey, supra note 111
("Marijuana isn't addictive in the same sense as heroin, from which withdrawal is an
agonizing, physical ordeal.").
116 Compare Lindsey Cook, The Heroin Epidemic, in 9 Graphs, U.S. NEWS (Aug.
19, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/08/19/theheroin-epidemic-in-9-graphs (reporting that heroin-related deaths increased by
286% between 2002 and 2013 and that in 2013 approximately 200 in 100,000
people were addicted to heroin, a number that doubled since 2002), with Kim
Bellware, Here's How Many People Fatally Overdosed on Marijuana Last Year,
HUFFPOST
(Dec. 28, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
marijuana-deaths-2014_-us_.56816417e4b06fa68880a217 (describing a CDC report
which states that there have been no deaths from marijuana overdoses).
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insomnia to Alzheimer's and cancer.11 7 Therefore, by examining past
rationales and assessing modern empirical research, no persuasive
justifications exist for marijuana's continued placement in Schedule 1.
B.

National Regulatory Scheme Is Not Necessary to Accomplish the
Goals of § 922 (g) (3)

Including marijuana in Schedule I renders it impossible for states to
establish a more permissive regulatory scheme than the one
contemplated by Congress in the CSA. In doing so, Congress
effectuated a broad, national scheme and imposed a one-size-fits-all
standard. The CSA, however, fails to achieve Congress's drug
enforcement priorities because lawful marijuana users are not the
"presumptively risky people" that § 922(g)(3) sought to target. Aside
from failing to further Congress's gun control objective, this overly
broad paradigm also fails to account for state interests and severely
limits a state's ability to serve as a laboratory for novel statutory
experiments, such as the legalization of recreational marijuana.
117 See Jen Christensen, 10 Diseases Where Medical Marijuana Could Have
Impact,
CNN (Apr. 16, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/15/health/marijuanamedical-advances (contending that medical marijuana may be used to help treat
multiple sclerosis, arthritis, and asthma); Jennifer Welsh & Kevin Loria, 23 Health
Benefits
of Marijuana, Bus.
INSIDER
(Apr.
20,
2014,
3:03
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/health-benefits-of-medical-marijuana-2014-4/#it-canbe-used-to-treat-glaucoma-i (discussing how marijuana can help treat glaucoma,
epileptic seizures, and hepatitis C). In fact, scientists studying cancer have found that
Cannabidiol, one of the chemical compounds in marijuana, may help prevent cells
from multiplying in certain aggressive cancers. Robin Wilkey, Marijuanaand Cancer:
Scientists Find Cancer Compound Stops Metastasis in Aggressive Cancers, HUFFPOST
(Sept. 9, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20l2/09/19/marijuana-andcancer n_1898208.html. However, some anecdotal evidence from Colorado shows the
other side of marijuana usage - health issues in newborns and teenagers as well as
difficulty combating driving while under the influence of marijuana. A doctor in
Pueblo, Colorado, which is home to more than ninety pot growing facilities, reports
seeing an increased number of infants being born with THC in their systems. Jonathan
LaPook, 60 Minutes: The Pot Vote (CBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2016),
He
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-five-states-to-vote-on-recreational-pot.
explains that exposure to marijuana in utero may lead to developmental and
behavioral problems in early childhood. Id. Further, the amount of teenagers seeking
medical attention following marijuana use has increased. Id. Because the brain is not
fully developed until approximately the mid-twenties, teenagers who are heavy
marijuana users (approximately four to five times a week) are more likely to have
damage in areas of the brain connected to cognitive functions, including memory,
attention, and ability to make decisions. Id. Finally, there is no field sobriety test for
marijuana that is the equivalent of the breathalyzer for alcohol. Id. Although police are
experimenting with a "roadside oral swab test," combating driving while under the
influence of marijuana remains a concern for law enforcement. Id.
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Specifically, the current method for regulating alcohol and tobacco on
a national and state level is not only indicative of the ability of the
federal and state governments to govern cohesively and achieve a
shared goal, but it also provides a blueprint for how marijuana should
be governed. Mimicking the alcohol and tobacco regulatory scheme in
the marijuana context is possible under § 922(g)(3) and marijuana's
current placement in Schedule 1.
1.

Prohibiting Legal Marijuana Users Under State Law from
Owning Firearms Does Not Further Congress's Objective to
Keep Guns out of the Hands of Risky People

In passing the GCA, Congress sought to "keep firearms out of the
hands of presumptively risky people" - specifically, dangerous drug
users.1 18 But, in doing so, the GCA cast its net too wide, improperly
reeling in lawful marijuana users. Indeed, although the statute
prohibits an "unlawful [drug] user" from possessing a firearm,
references to "lawful" or "unlawful" drug users are notably absent
from an investigation of the GCA's legislative history.119
Congress's initial goal was to decrease crime and improve public
safety by preventing dangerous people from possessing firearms.1 20
Congress emphasized, however, that it did not intend to restrict gun
ownership or to keep guns away from law-abiding citizens.121 Such a
broad finding of the legislative history naturally leaves the lawful
marijuana user in a precarious position.

118 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 n.6 (1983).

119 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 921(a) (2018) (failing to define "lawful" and
"unlawful" drug users, or to distinguish between the two).
120 See Barrett v. United States; 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (articulating that the
structure of the GCA reaffirms that dangerous persons "are comprehensively barred
by the [GCA] from acquiring firearms by any means"); see also 132 CONG. REC. H1696
(1986) ("Let us represent that civilized society in this House and vote for the safety of
our police officers, our public officials, and every other citizen who fears that someday
he or she may be looking down the barrel of a handgun."); 114 CONG. REc. 21784
(1968) ("[W]e are convinced that a strengthened system can significantly contribute
to reducing the danger of crime in the United States. No one can dispute the need to
prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mental
disturbances, and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or
possessing firearms.").
121 Rich v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (reiterating that
"[tihe provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 were not designed to deprive every
citizen access to firearms"); 131 CONG. REc. S9101 (1985) (maintaining that Congress
does not want to burden "the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes").
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Nevertheless, delving deeper into § 922(g)(3) and its purpose
reveals that Congress did not intend to punish the lawful marijuana
user for possession of a firearm; similarly, the statute fails to capture
Congress's intended targets - users of other substances who should
not possess a weapon.1 22 First, a statutory interpretation of § 922(g)(3)
and an investigation of the empirical studies on marijuana, which
demonstrate that marijuana does not lead to violent behavior, expose
that § 922(g)(3) over-extends to lawful marijuana users. Furthermore,
the judicially created test improperly focuses all of its attention on the
temporal nexus of the unlawful drug use, while failing to identify the
boundaries of "unlawful" use. Conversely, the GCA also fails to
penalize individuals that pose a greater threat from drug use and gun
possession - in other words, it fails to include other, more dangerous
predictors for violence. Therefore, § 922(g)(3) is both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive.
a.

Section 922(g) (3) Is Over-Inclusive

First, § 922(g)(3) is over-inclusive, improperly catching in its
dragnet lawful marijuana users. Indeed, lawful marijuana users are not
the "presumptively risky people" that Congress sought to punish. 123
Although a statutory construction demonstrates that an "unlawful"
user according to the GCA should not include the lawful marijuana
user, 124 one need not unnecessarily befall to such an abstract, textual

122 Of course, this Article neither advocates nor condones possession of a firearm
while the user is under the influence of marijuana. On the contrary, this Article
focuses on the rights of the sober, lawful marijuana user.
123 See supra note 117 (illustrating the positive effects of marijuana).
124 A statutory interpretation exercise would begin by analyzing the plain meaning
of the phrase "unlawful user." See United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278
(1929) (establishing that "where the language of an enactment is clear, and
construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended"). See generally Plain-Meaning Rule, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004) (defining the plain meaning rule as the "rule that if a writing ... appears to
be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the writing itself
without resort to any extrinsic evidence"). The common meaning of the word "user"
in this context includes anyone who uses controlled substances. However, Congress
chose to modify the word "user" with the word "unlawful," so the term "unlawful
user" should be analyzed as a unit. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015)
("If the statutory language is plain, the Court must enforce it according to its terms.
But oftentimes the meaning - or ambiguity - of certain words or phrases may only
become evident when placed in context. So when deciding whether the language is
plain, the Court must read the words 'in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme."'). The term "unlawful user" is defined as "not
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inquiry. A survey of modern empirical studies and an examination of
the judicially created test exhibit the overreach of § 922(g) (3).
Although the GCA seeks to prevent violent individuals from
possessing firearms, empirical studies demonstrate that marijuana
users are not necessarily violent people. Not only did research from
President Nixon's 1970 commission dispel many of the myths
associated with marijuana, 125 but current research also vindicates
marijuana use.1 26 In fact, doctors in twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia prescribe medical marijuana to suffering
patients.1 27 Research has demonstrated that marijuana is not a gateway
authorized by law; illegal" or "criminally punishable." Unlawful, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra. The plain meaning analysis seems to reveal that the phrase
"unlawful user" should not describe lawful marijuana users in any particular state that
has chosen to legalize marijuana use. Nonetheless, if a plain meaning analysis is
deemed not particularly persuasive or helpful, courts will apply the rule of lenity and
construe an ambiguous statute to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (asserting that "no citizen should be
held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain"). The
rule of lenity may be appropriate to apply to "unlawful user," and if it is, any disputes
over whether criminal defendants qualify as unlawful marijuana users under the
statute should be resolved in favor of those individuals.
125 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text
(discussing Presidential
commissions' findings that dismissed common misperceptions about marijuana and
its users). Indeed, the commission ultimately recommended to decriminalize
marijuana. See THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, supra note 46
(advocating that "[p]ossession of mariljluana for personal use [should] no longer be
an offense").
126 See, e.g., Trevor Bennett et al., The Statistical Association Between Drug Misuse
and Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 107, 117 (2008)
(comparing the "odds of offending" between crack users, 6 times greater, and
marijuana users, only 1.5 times greater); Michael K. Ostrowsky, Does Marijuana Use
Lead to Aggression and Violent Behavior?, 41 J. DRUG EDUc. 369, 381 (2011)
(suggesting that most studies "provide rather weak evidence for the suggestion that
marijuana use directly leads to violent behavior" because they fail to account for
confounding variables); Jennifer M. Reingle et al., The Relationship Between Marijuana
Use and Intimate Partner Violence in a Nationally Representative, Longitudinal Sample,
27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1562, 1572 (2012) (indicating that studies may be
skewed because "legislation legalizing marijuana use" may increase access to
marijuana use and, "therefore, increase the harm associated with marijuana use (e.g.,
domestic violence, chronic diseases, and unintentional injuries)").
127 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (conferring the medical benefits of
marijuana, such as alleviating nausea and pain for cancer and HIV/AID patients).
Moreover, Arkansas, Florida, and North Dakota recently passed voter initiatives to
legalize marijuana. See Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016),
2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-victory-in-florida. Now, twenty-nine states and
the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana
States and DC, PROCON.ORG, https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?
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drug to other, more dangerous drugs.1 28 By targeting marijuana users
in order to keep firearms away from "presumptively risky people," the
statute fails to include other indicators of violence that are stronger
than marijuana consumption. For instance, some studies reveal that
those who consume alcohol are much more likely to be violent than
those who consume marijuana.1 29 Therefore, lawful marijuana users
are not the "presumptively risky people" whom Congress sought to
disenfranchise.
Moreover, the judicially created test unnecessarily focuses on the
wrong
temporal
nexus.
Rather
than
emphasize
the
contemporaneousness of drug use and firearm possession, the test
condemns the regularity of drug use and firearm possession.1 30
Although courts typically focus on just two factors - regularity and
contemporaneousness - the test is more aptly characterized as three
factors: (1) the unlawful possession or use of a drug, pursuant to the
CSA; (2) the regularity of the drug use; and (3) the contemporaneous
possession of the drug and a firearm.131 Emphasizing the regularity of
drug use, however, fails to accomplish Congress's initial goal of the
GCA. Indeed, the judicially created test penalizes any individual who
lawfully consumes marijuana, as long as he or she "regularly" uses it.

resourcelD=000881 (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
128 See Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 129
(D.D.C. 1980) (citing GRINSPOON, supra note 112, at 230-322 (2d ed. 1977))

(asserting that marijuana causes neither aggressive behavior nor insanity); see also
HANSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 387 (noting that factors such as personality and
social environment are much more important factors for determining whether a
person will move on to harder drugs).
129 See Evelyn H. Wei et al., Teasing Apart the Developmental Associations Between
Alcohol and Marijuana Use and Violence, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 166, 168, 175
(2004) (contending that "aggressive acts were more often related to self-reported
acute alcohol use than to marijuana use," and finding that "participants who had ever
engaged in violence, 93.1% had ever used alcohol, 88.5% had ever used alcohol
frequently, 85.1% had ever smoked marijuana, and 78.2% had ever smoked marijuana
frequently"); see also Todd M. Moore & Gregory L. Stuart, A Review of the Literature
on Marijuana and Interpersonal Violence, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAv..171, 184
(2003) (speculating that the relationship between alcohol use and violence is
complicated, and listing over ten factors, such as "Witnessing Parental Violence" and
"Family History of Substance Use").
130 Recall that courts use this common law test to determine the scope of "unlawful
user" according to the GCA. See supra notes 88-91.
131 United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 832, 838-39 (5th Cir. 2005) (surveying
recent case law and concluding that "cases interpreting § 922(g)(3) typically discuss
two concepts: contemporaneousness and regularity"); see supra notes 88-91
(discussing the courts' use of the factors and advancing a simpler notation of the
judicially created test for "unlawful use").
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Even if the user waits a week between drug use and firearm
possession, he or she still commits a felony. The test inappropriately
targets the wrong cohort.132
Rather than penalize the lawful marijuana user, courts should adjust
their test to capture the appropriate cohort and advance the goals of
§ 922(g)(3). The test should criminalize two distinct types of conduct:
(1) the ordinary drug user that possesses a firearm while under the
influence of drugs, and (2) the drug trafficker that is wielding a
firearm to further his illegal operation. Because the current test focuses
on regularity, it fails to prevent these dangerous conditions.
Ostensibly, an individual who consumes a harmful, illicit drug and
then operates a firearm may escape indictment, as long as he or she
does not partake regularly in the illicit drug. Thus, the judicially
created test mistakenly extends its prosecutorial reach to the lawful
marijuana user, over-including them in § 922(g)(3)'s grasp.
b.

Section 922(g) (3) Is Under-Inclusive

Second, by failing to capture the dangerous individuals engaged in
drug use and violence, § 922(g)(3) is inadequately under-inclusive.
Congress's initial intent. in passing the GCA undisputedly was to keep
guns away from especially dangerous or violent people. 133 In only
prohibiting individuals who use "controlled substances" from
possessing firearms,1 34 Congress excluded those who use other
dangerous substances that are effective predictors for violence, such as
alcohol. Studies have continuously shown that alcohol use and
violence are intrinsically linked.1 35 Experts reach the opposite
132 In essence, this Article equates the lawful marijuana user with the generally
law-abiding citizen.
133 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst. Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 n.6 (1983); see supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text (identifying that the purpose of the GCA is to
deny dangerous people the ability to possess a firearm). While some aspects of the
GCA legislative history remain ambiguous - namely, the definition of "unlawful
user" - the portions describing Congress's broad goals behind the legislation are
clear. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213-14
(asserting that the GCA is not intended "to place any undue or unnecessary Federal
restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens").
134 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2018) (indicating that a
"controlled substance" is a substance "included in 1Schedule 1, II, III, IV, or V";
alcohol is not included in this list).
135 See, e.g., Wei et al., supra note 129 (finding that "aggressive acts were more
often related to self-reported acute alcohol use than to marijuana use" and that "of
participants who had ever engaged in violence, 93.1% had ever used alcohol, 88.5%
had ever used alcohol frequently, 85.1% had ever smoked marijuana, and 78.2% had
ever smoked marijuana frequently").
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conclusion for marijuana users, however, failing to identify a direct
connection between violence and marijuana use.1 36 Congress therefore
sacrificed the opportunity to keep guns away from alcohol users
who are more likely to become violent - only to unfairly punish
lawful marijuana users.
2.

Accomplishing Congress's Goal of Keeping Guns out of the
Hands of "Dangerous People" Through Other Means

Maintaining marijuana in Schedule I effectuates an inappropriate
national standard to regulate marijuana, thereby muting any possible
expression the states could voice on the matter. The federal
government should have a role in regulating marijuana, partnering
with states to establish a scheme that accommodates all interests.
Regulatory schemes for alcohol and tobacco provide a useful model to
show how such coordination can further the goals of Congress
without unnecessarily impeding on a state's rights. 137 This type of
136 A variety of empirical studies have demonstrated that marijuana is not an
automatic predictor for violent tendencies. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 126
(finding that the correlation between using marijuana and committing violent offenses
is far less significant than for other scheduled drugs); Moore & Stuart, supra note 129,
at 183 (highlighting the complex relationship between marijuana use and violence by
observing that "many violent individuals abstain from using marijuana and many
marijuana users do not engage in violent behavior").
137 Despite any preemption arguments to the contrary, conflicting federal and state
marijuana laws can coexist without frustrating the purpose of the GCA. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution governs situations in which federal and state
laws conflict. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding."). Nonetheless, federalism allows states "great latitude
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006); see
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (asserting that state police
powers should not be preempted unless "that is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress"). Affording states broad authority promotes innovation and the potential
for states to serve as smaller experimental vehicles for new ideas. Federal legislation
can supersede state legislation vis-a-vis field preemption or obstacle preemption.
Courts typically find field preemption when the federal legislative scheme is "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The CSA
explicitly denies any intent to engage in field preemption. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018)
("No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of the Congress to occupy the field to the exclusion of any State law . . . unless
there is a positive conflict .. . so that the two [provisions] cannot consistently stand
together."). However, courts will find obstacle preemption when compliance with
both federal and state law is impossible, or where the state law "stands as an obstacle
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framework would facilitate state laboratories to advance novel policies
to the benefit of the entire nation.1 38 As a result, the federal
government and the states legalizing recreational marijuana can
cooperate by mirroring this paradigm.
The manner in which the state and federal governments regulate
alcohol and tobacco would be a particularly effective model for
regulating marijuana, furthering federal goals while simultaneously
allowing states to exercise their own judgment. For instance, although
the federal government taxes the sale of alcohol and tobacco, states
may levy their own, additional excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.1 39
Three states -

Colorado, Oregon, and Washington -

have already

collected huge excises from state marijuana taxes, which have funded
state law enforcement, education, education campaigns on marijuana
safety, and other state initiatives.1 40 For example, dispensaries in
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). That being said, a state's decision to
legalize marijuana does not present an obstacle to Congress's intent to keep guns away
from "presumptively risky people" because marijuana users are not inherently
dangerous. See supra Section II.B.1 and accompanying text (explaining how the GCA
is both over- and under-inclusive, failing to accomplish Congress's goal to target
individuals with presumptively violent tendencies). If the government deschedules
marijuana as per the recommendation of this Article, however, the preemption
discussion is moot, thereby limiting the value of a full discussion here. On preemption
and marijuana laws, see generally Lea Brilmayer, A General Theory of Preemption:With
Comments on State Decriminalizationof Marijuana,58 B.C. L. REV. 895 (2017).
138 Indeed, our federal structure endows the states with the responsibility and
opportunity to tailor their legislation to specific needs and model novel, progressive
policies. Hindsight provides other states the option to choose these progressive
policies a la carte with confidence in their ultimate result from the pioneer states'
lessons learned. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 n.20 (1977) ("Denial of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."); see also Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F.
Supp. 1297, 1301 (D.NJ. 1979) (contending that "[q]uestions ... of preemption . . are essentially questions of local and State law rather than of federal
law").
139 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the taxation of alcohol
and tobacco products at the federal level).
140 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (providing a breakdown of how
the three states are investing their marijuana tax revenue). For example, Oregon
delineated the allocation of the marijuana tax revenue as follows: 40% for Common
School Fund; 20% for Mental Health, Alcoholism, and Drug Services Account (Or.
Rev. Stat. § 430.380 (2018)); 15% for State Police; 10% for cities' law enforcement;
10% for counties' local law enforcement; and 5% for Oregon Health Authority for
alcohol and drug abuse prevention, early intervention, and treatment services. H.B.
2041, 78th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2015). Specifically, in Washington, marijuana retailers
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Colorado sold $996.2 million worth of medical and recreational
marijuana in 2015.141 This system would permit states to exercise their
judgment on how best to address health and public safety concerns
surrounding marijuana use. Rather than depend on an ambiguous
federal statute, states could use this tax revenue stream to fund state
programs intended to keep guns out of the hands of risky individuals.
Mirroring the taxation structure of alcohol and tobacco would provide
states the opportunity to impose excise taxes on marijuana and
appropriately allocate the revenue toward programs specifically
tailored toward their needs.
Rather than acquiescing to federal prohibition, states should control
distribution of marijuana within their boundaries.1 42 Delegating to the
states and allowing them to opt in or opt out of marijuana's
legalization as they choose allows them to closely monitor marijuana.
Colorado has already amended its state constitution to provide a retail
scheme for marijuana that is similar to that of alcohol; state and local
governments decide what limits to impose on the drug's distribution
instead of deferring to government restrictions. 143 Section 922(g)(3)
imports the CSA's prohibition of marijuana that essentially prevents
states from imposing their own distribution, retail, or regulatory
schemes because the drug is classified in Schedule I. In theory,

have sold more than $275 million in marijuana and marijuana-related products, and
Washington's Office of Financial Management budget estimates that marijuana sales
tax will bring in more than $1 billion in the next four years. See Jareen Imam, Pot
Money Changing Hearts in Washington, CNN (July 11, 2015, 11:21 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/10/us/washington-marijuana-70-million-tax-dollars;
Kate Smith, supra note 72. Although Alaska has yet to begin taxing marijuana, the
Department of Revenue Tax Division predicts $12 million in tax revenue, and the
State plans to appropriate $3 million to recidivism reduction in 2017 and $6 million in
subsequent years. See Laurel Andrews, Here's Where Half of the Revenue from Alaska's
Legal Pot Will Go, ALASKA DISPATCH NEws (July 14, 2016), http://www.adn.com/alaska-

marijuana/2016/07/12/heres-where-half-of-the-revenue-from-alaskas-legal-pot-will-go
(explaining that Alaska's planned marijuana excise tax works in tandem with the new
criminal reform bill aimed at reducing the prison population and associated costs, by
providing funds to further this goal).
141 Tom Huddleston, Jr., Colorado's Legal MarijuanaIndustry Is Worth More than $1
Billion, FORTUNE (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:19 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/11 /marijuanabillion-dollars-colorado (predicting that total U.S. medical and recreational marijuana
sales could reach $22 billion by 2020).
142 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing states' alcohol distribution
schemes, including "dry" and "wet" counties, which are specifically mandated by each
state).
143 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (detailing Colorado's marijuana
regulation scheme).
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Colorado may apply its own retail scheme to marijuana, but doing so
would ignore federal law. 144
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to its enumerated powers in the Constitution, Congress may
legislate federal law applicable to U.S. territories and states; however,
federalism - a bedrock principle of the Republic - ensures that states
retain the power to legislate areas outside the scope of Congress's
enumerated powers.1 45 Respecting state sovereignty provides an
important function in our country: it allows states to serve as
laboratories, "try [ing] novel social and economic experiments without
the risk to the rest of the country."1 46 The Framers intentionally

-

-

designed our bicameral Congress to operate slowly and require
bipartisan consent to pass laws. To reduce political risk and speed up its
efficiency, Congress may look to imitate successful state laws. However,
if the federal government interferes with state legislatures' ability to
experiment with new policy, the value of federalism is all but lost.
Recreational marijuana presents precisely the type of federal and
state government conflict that the Framers sought to avoid; the federal
government's insistence on retaining marijuana in Schedule I threatens
to render state legislatures impotent. Federal law which
criminalizes marijuana pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act
and state law - which decriminalizes marijuana pursuant to
legislative actions by eight states and the District of Columbia
clash, causing confusion and uncertainty. This inconsistency between
lawmakers created a conflict, and in recent times, § 922(g)(3) has
served as its battleground.
Section 9 2 2(g)(3) essentially prevents an individual from exercising
the constitutional right to possess a firearm while also lawfully
smoking recreational marijuana, leaving him or her in the center of a
confrontation between federal and state government. The
consequences of this conflict implicate citizens engaging in seemingly
144 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that because of the
criminality still attached to marijuana due to the Schedule I drug classification, federal
law will not allow banks or credit unions to take "marijuana money" from
dispensaries, leaving them with no adequate way to safeguard their proceeds other
than letting the money pile up in warehouses).
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U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
146 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 n.20 (1977); see also supra note 138 and
accompanying text (describing the state laboratory theory).
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innocuous conduct, such as Mike and Mary from Colorado, instead of
more dangerous individuals whom Congress sought to target when
passing § 922(g)(3). Penalizing the firearm owner that occasionally
uses marijuana - instead of the firearm owner that continually abuses
alcohol, for example - is counterintuitive given the plethora of
research showing that marijuana users are not violent, especially
compared to alcohol users. The contradictory juxtaposition of whom
§ 922(g)(3) sought to target versus whom it actually targets reveals
the over- and under-inclusive reach of the statute.
This failure in § 922(g)(3) demonstrates that a national regulatory
scheme is not actually necessary to accomplish Congress's goals. In its
current form, the system is both too broad - punishing lawful,
nonviolent marijuana users -

and too narrow -

neglecting to punish

potentially violent alcohol users. Section 922(g)(3), therefore, fails in
preventing "presumptively risky people" from owning firearms - as it
purports to do - precisely because lawful marijuana users are not
"presumptively risky" at all. The GCA also effectively eliminates a
states' right to allow its citizens who possess firearms to fully
participate in lawful marijuana use without valid rationale. Allowing
states to regulate marijuana use - similar to how states currently
regulate alcohol and tobacco - is a better option that more adequately
fosters the concepts of federalism. Because of § 922(g)(3)'s reach,
applying this type of regulatory scheme is not possible as long as
marijuana remains a Schedule I drug.
Removing marijuana from its current Schedule I position would, in
one fell swoop, alleviate, if not completely remove, the problems that
have resulted from placing marijuana in a category with the most
dangerous drugs.147 Marijuana shares few characteristics with the
other dangerous drugs listed in Schedule I such as heroin and LSD.
The original placement of marijuana in Schedule I was driven mostly
by racial animus, rather than a legitimate belief that marijuana
warranted its Schedule I label. The motive for placing marijuana in
Schedule I is clear: President Nixon and his aides are on record
revealing their plan to punish conduct that would implicate
147 Anticipating this solution, two members of the House of Representatives
introduced a bipartisan bill to remove marijuana from the CSA in April 2017. See
Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2017, H.R. 1227, 115th Cong. (2017)
(proposing to "limit the application of Federal laws to the distribution and
consumption of mari[jluana" by removing the drug from the CSA). See generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, Introduction: MarijuanaLaws and Federalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 857,
861 (2017) ("If Congress passed a law legalizing possessing small amounts of
marijuana and preempted states from prohibiting this, the federalism issues would be

solved.").
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minorities. Just as marijuana's initial placement in Schedule I was
unfounded, its continued placement in the same schedule as heroin
and ecstasy is unjustified. For a drug to be placed in Schedule 1, it
must lack accepted medical benefits and carry a high potential for
abuse. However, ample research suggests that marijuana has many
medical benefits, ranging from chronic pain relief to controlling
epileptic seizures, and that it does not have a high rate of addiction.
An unwarranted consequence of marijuana's placement in Schedule I
is that lawful marijuana users lose their constitutional right to own a
firearm, providing yet another reason that descheduling marijuana is a
necessary step in maintaining the federalist principles that this country
embraces.
Descheduling marijuana is not only appropriate, but also logical
considering how many states have legalized medical and recreational
marijuana. An individual's lawful marijuana use on the state level may
lead to significant problems on the federal level. Aside from not being
able to own or possess a firearm pursuant to § 9 2 2 (g)(3), an
individual's lawful marijuana use jeopardizes benefits such as
subsidized government housing, and social security. Moreover, the
CSA prohibits research regarding any of the Schedule I drugs. In
effect, this provision grants the government the opportunity to shield
its cursory scheduling decisions without showing its rationale.
Although the Executive Branch, under President Obama, removed this
barrier to permit research for marijuana in August 2016,148 the current
administration's hostility toward marijuana and other new drugs may
set a precedent to ban potentially beneficial drugs in a knee-jerk
reaction without any research. 149 For example, the federal government
is seriously considering placing kratom, an herbal drug used to fight
opioid addiction, in Schedule I because the government simply does

148 Catherine Saint Louis & Matt Apuzzo, Obama Administration Set to Remove Barrier
to Marijuana Research, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/
1 1/science/obama-administration-set-to-remove-barrier-to-marijuana-research.html?
r=0 (providing that before the action it was nearly "impossible" to find marijuana for
research purposes, but now the "Obama administration is planning to remove a major
roadblock to marijuana research ... potentially spurring broad scientific study of a drug
that is being used to treat dozens of diseases in states across the nation").
149 See Hayley Miller, Jeff Sessions Warns of an America with 'MarijuanaSold at Every
Corner Grocery Store,' HUFFPOST (Feb. 28, 2017, 12:34 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeff-sessions-warns-america-marijuana-grocery-store-us
58b58d8de4b0a8a9b7863d93? (describing Attorney General Jeff Sessions as "a
longtime opponent of marijuana use" and quoting Sessions as commenting that "we
don't need to be legalizing marijuana").
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50 Rather than reflexively placing
not know enough about the drug.o
potentially life-saving drugs in Schedule I, the federal government
should allow access to these drugs for research purposes.
Marijuana should never have been placed in Schedule I and its
continued placement in Schedule I has no justification. Research
shows that marijuana is neither addictive nor harmful, and does not
lead to violent tendencies in its users. Furthermore, marijuana has
many medical benefits that help individuals cope with illnesses.
Several states have recognized the benefits of marijuana and legalized
the drug, which subsequently puts the citizens of those states in an
unfortunate conundrum - by smoking marijuana, citizens engage in
conduct that is legal on the state level but illegal on the federal level.
The interplay between guns and marijuana in § 922(g)(3) essentially
precludes individuals from exercising their constitutional right to own
a firearm - and deprives individuals from other statutory benefits
such as welfare - by simply following lawful regulations in states that
permit recreational marijuana. If the government deschedules
marijuana - rather than continue to punish individuals that Congress
never actually sought to target with § 922(g)(3) - it may apply the
same regulatory scheme that is currently used for alcohol and tobacco
sales, resulting in potentially enormous tax revenue. With nothing to
lose other than antiquated notions about marijuana that the Nixon
Administration instilled, descheduling marijuana is a necessary,
logical solution to a problem that has permeated the lives of citizens
merely engaging in conduct that is lawful in their state. Depriving
citizens of constitutional rights is rarely appropriate, and the tension
between federal and state sovereigns begs for resolution.

See Paul Fassa, Kratom: Why Is the FDA Banning This Herb that Helps Break
HEALTH IMPACT NEWS (Sept.
12, 2016),
https://healthimpactnews.com/2016/kratom-why-is-the-fda-banning-this-herb-thathelps-break-addiction-to-opioid-drug-addicts (reporting that the "DEA has announced
plans to post another harmless plant as [S]chedule I"); Nick Wing, Some Say Kratom Is
a Solution to Opioid Addiction. Not If Drug Warriors Ban It First, HUFFPOST (Mar. 3,
2016, 8:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kratom-ban-drug-policy-us56c38a87e4b0c3c55052ee3f (revealing various news stories where kratom has helped
those suffering from either pain or drug addiction).
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